Concentration of Bid Prices Just Above the Standard Minimum Price in Public Construction Works

Abstract

In Japan, contract offices are mandated to set threshold prices for public works. A threshold price is the upper limit of the bid price, and a contractor who exceeds this threshold is disqualified. Furthermore, based on the threshold price, a minimum price is set as a price requiring investigation before acceptance. In recent years, bids and contracts for public works have generally had bid prices concentrated slightly above the standard minimum for investigation. It has been pointed out that this tendency is detrimental in terms of the motivation of engineers and social costs. In this study, we confirm that this tendency was alleviated and that the level of the winning bidder's technical evaluation score was feasible at the same time. In addition, we obtained quantitative findings on variables that affect both above. Furthermore, although it is impossible to achieve a perfect balance between alleviating the tendency of prices to concentrate slightly above the standard minimum for investigation and sufficient technical evaluation scores, elements necessary to improve the overall situation were quantitatively identified.